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NOTES
Target Directors' Fiduciary Duties: An Initial
Reasonableness Burden
The use of the unsolicited "tender offer"' as a means of gar-
nishing corporate control has become a frequent phenomenon on
the American business scene.2 Corporate financers, seeking to ac-
quire a controlling interest in a company through a tender offer,
can provide stockholders of that company with a substantial return
on their investment, sometimes greatly exceeding the stock's cur-
rent market price.
With the increase in the use of unsolicited tender offers, direc-
tors of companies faced with a takeover threat (target boards) have
developed their own tactics 3 in an effort to deter takeovers they be-
lieve are not in the best interests of their companies and stockhold-
ers. As a result, stockholders are often prevented from realizing a
profit. Unfriendly bidders deterred from making tender offers, and
shareholders denied the financial benefits, have challenged both
the validity of these tactics and the authority of directors to adopt
them. They assert that the intricacies of the tactics violate statutory
1 Federal "tender offer" legislation fails to define the term. Courts have formulated
their own definition. The court in SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945
(9th Cir. 1985), found that the existence of a tender offer is determined by the following
factors: (1) active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders for shares of an issuer;
(2) solicitation made for a substantial percentage of the issuer's stock; (3) offer to purchase
made at a premium over the prevailing market price; (4) terms of the offer are firm rather
than negotiable; (5) offer contingent on the tender of a fixed maximum number to be
purchased; (6) offer open only for a limited period of time; (7) offeree subjected to selling
pressure; and (8) public announcements of a purchasing program concerning the target
company precede or accompany rapid accumulation of a large amount of a target's securi-
ties. Id. at 950 (citing Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),
aft'don other grounds, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983)). See also
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 626 n.1 (1982); Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774
F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985) (Hanson I). For a more encompassing definition, see S-G Securities,
Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1126-27 (D. Mass. 1978) (a publicly announced
intention to acquire a substantial block of a company's stock with the purpose of obtaining
control and the subsequent rapid acquisition of large blocks of the stock constitutes a
tender offer).
2 See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1984). See generally
Rosenzweig & Orens, Tipping the Scales-The Business Judgment Rule in the Antitakeover Context,
14 SEC. REG. L.J. 23 (1986); Lipton & Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Directors' Responsi-
bilities-An Update, 40 Bus. LAw. 1403 (1985); Siegel, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics: A Proposal
For Reform, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 377 (1985); Easterbrook &Jarrell, Do Targets Gain From Defeat-
ing Tender Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277 (1984); Greene &Junewicz, A Reappraisal of Current
Regulation of Mergers and Acquisitions, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (1984).
3 See tactics used in cases cited at note 16 infra.
law and that the directors have breached their fiduciary duties. 4
This note suggests an approach courts should adopt when ex-
amining a target board's actions taken in response to a takeover
threat. Part I addresses a board's fiduciary relationship to its com-
pany and shareholders and discusses the business judgment rule.
Part II recommends that courts, to ensure that a target board's ac-
tions protect the interests of the company and its shareholders,
should require the directors to show the overall reasonableness of
their actions. Part III analyzes the factors courts should consider to
determine reasonableness. By applying the proper review, courts
can keep the market for corporate control functioning in a manner
that allows beneficial takeovers to occur, while giving a board suffi-
cient authority to prevent those that do not benefit the company
and its shareholders.
I. Fiduciary Duties and the Business Judgment Rule
State corporation statutes 5 give directors broad authority to
make decisions pertaining to their corporation's "business and af-
fairs.",6 Despite this broad power, state statutes and courts impose
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty on directors. The duty of care
requires a board of directors to exercise the care that a reasonably
prudent person in a similar position would use under similar cir-
cumstances. 7 The duty of loyalty requires directors to act in the
4 See cases cited at note 16 infra.
5 Prior to 1968, tender offers were unregulated at the federal level and only one state
had such regulation. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CON-
TROL 1-10 (1973). Congress amended sections 13 and 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (1934 Act) with the Williams Act in 1968 and 1970. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), (e),
78n(d)-(f) (1981 & Supp. 1986). The Williams Act is primarily a disclosure statute. See S.
REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1968). See also Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (breach of fiduciary duty is a
matter of state law); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1018 (1983) (Williams Act does not create any substantive right to challenge the
defensive actions of target directors). The Act makes it unlawful for a person to make a
tender offer for 57o of certain 1934 Act companies unless at the time of the offer such
person has filed a statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission disclosing the
bidder's purpose for the offer, source of funds, financial background and, if the bidder
intends to acquire a controlling interest, any future plans for structural or operational
changes in the company. The tender offeror must include the same information in solicita-
tion materials sent to shareholders and the target board. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1), n(d)(1)
(1981). The Williams Act also prohibits fraud in connection with a tender offer, gives
shareholders specific withdrawal rights, and requires the bidder to purchase shares ten-
dered during the first ten days on a pro-rata basis. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5), (6), (e) (1981).
6 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983) ("the business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors"); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 701 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1986) ("the
business of a corporation shall be managed under the direction of its board of directors").
7 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 (West 1977); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200 (Callaghan
1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-14 (West 1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 717 (McKinney
1963 & Supp. 1986); TEx. Bus. CORP. Aar ANN. art. 2.41D (Vernon 1980); Sampson v.
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best interest of the corporation and its stockholders, and not in
their own self-interest.8
When reviewing a board's ordinary business decision to deter-
mine whether the directors have breached their fiduciary duties,
courts have traditionally applied the business judgment rule. The
rule affords directors a presumption that they acted on an informed
basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that they took the ac-
tion in the best interests of the corporation and its stockholders. 9
The rule thus incorporates the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.
The majority of courts require a plaintiff seeking to establish a
prima facie case for breach of fiduciary duty to rebut the presump-
tion. 0 If the plaintiff successfully rebuts one of the three elements,
the directors generally must show that their decision was substan-
tively fair to the company and shareholders."
Courts often indicate that in applying the business judgment
rule they are deferring to the broad authority that state legislatures
Hunt, 665 P.2d 743, 754 (Kan. 1983); FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 594 P.2d
1332, 1334 (Utah 1979). The Delaware Supreme Court has adopted a more lenient stan-
dard. To show a breach of the duty of care, a plaintiff must show that the directors were
grossly negligent. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
8 Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984); Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503,
510 (Del. 1939)); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984); Auerbach v. Bennett,
47 N.Y.2d 619, 629, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979). See generally
Ruder, Duty of Loyalty--A Law Professor's Status Report, 40 Bus. LAw. 1383 (1985).
9 See Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 240 (D. Neb. 1972), aff'd, 473 F.2d
537 (8th Cir. 1973); Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1973); Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472
F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994,419
N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). Directors often assert the business judgment rule as a defense to the
merits of a plaintiff's claim. Directors have increasingly asserted the business judgment
rule offensively prior to a review of the merits of a claim to dismiss shareholder derivative
suits. See generally Block & Prussin, Termination of Derivative Suits Against Directors on Business
Judgment Grounds: From Zapata to Aronson, 39 Bus. LAw. 1503 (1984).
10 Courts have found that if a plaintiff demonstrates a breach of either the duty of due
care or loyalty, it is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of breach of fiduciary duty. See
Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 274-77 (2d Cir. 1986) (Han-
son II) (the plaintiff rebutted presumption by showing that the directors did not adequately
inform themselves); Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (under the business judgment rule di-
rectors who have made an unintelligent or uninformed judgment are not protected) (citing
Mitchell v. Highland-Western Glass, 19 Del. Ch. 326, 330, 167 A. 831, 833 (1933)). See also
Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 265-67 (2d Cir. 1984) (plaintiff rebutted
presumption by showing directors' self-dealing).
11 See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 n.17 (Del. 1981) (where the plain-
tiff shows directors' self-interest, the burden shifts to the directors to establish the "intrinsic
fairness" of their decision). See also Hanson II, 781 F.2d 264, 278-79 (burden shifted to
directors to show substantive fairness of their defensive action after plaintiff showed direc-
tors acted on an uninformed basis); Bellis v. Thal, 373 F. Supp. 120, 123 (E.D. Pa. 1974),
aff'd, 510 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1975); Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985) (where plain-
tiff showed directors failed to inform themselves, directors were liable for the difference
between agreed merger price and intrinsic value of their company).
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have afforded directors.' 2 Others contend that the rule encourages
competent people to become directors without fear of personal lia-
bility for honest errors of judgment.' 3 Additionally, courts have
suggested that they are not equipped to review the merits of com-
plex business decisions, as opposed to the decisionmaking process,
made by highly qualified persons.' 4
Target boards have relied on their broad authority to imple-
ment tactics which deter unfriendly takeovers. 15 Directors have as-
serted that in voting to pursue a particular defensive plan, they
were making a decision no different than any other business deci-
sion.16 Accordingly, directors contend that courts should apply the
business judgment rule to their decisions, regardless of whether
made in the face of a takeover threat or in the ordinary course of
their company's business affairs. On the other hand, shareholders
and raiders point out that in the majority of situations, once an un-
friendly bidder acquires a controlling interest, the raider replaces
12 See Zapata, 430 A.2d at 782.
13 See generally Block & Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Ac-
tions: Viva Zapata?, 37 Bus. LAW. 27, 32-33 (1981). In response to this concern, Delaware
passed a provision allowing companies to limit the personal liability of directors for
breaches of the duty of care. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (effectiveJuly 1, 1986).
Equitable remedies, including injunctive relief and rescission, are still available.
14 See Zapata, 430 A.2d at 782; Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630, 393 N.E.2d
994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979).
15 The majority of states have amended either their corporation or blue sky provisions
to regulate tender offers. State legislatures have attempted to protect local management
through these provisions by overburdening unfriendly tender offerors. See, e.g., North Star
Int'l v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1983) (state commission makes a
binding determination as to the fairness of a tender offer). Various tender offer provisions
tend to give directors an unreasonable advantage to resist a takeover by giving them excess
time and placing additional costs and delay on bidders. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel,
The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1161
(1981). Through careful scrutiny of state takeover statutes, courts have prevented state leg-
islatures from disrupting the balance of neutrality between takeover parties in favor of tar-
get management. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (Illinois Business Take-
Over Act invalid under commerce clause); L.P. Acquisition Co. v. Tyson, 772 F.2d 201 (6th
Cir. 1985) (Williams Act preempts provisions of Michigan Take-Over Offers Act); National
City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (portions of Missouri Takeover
Bid Disclosure Act invalid under supremacy and commerce clauses); Bendix Corp. v. Mar-
tin Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md. 1982) (Maryland Corporate Take-Over Law
was a direct restraint on interstate commerce and also frustrated accomplishment of federal
securities laws in violation of supremacy clause). See generally Sargent, Do the Second-Genera-
tion State Takeover Statutes Violate the Commerce Clause?, 8 CORP. L. REv. 3 (1985).
16 See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir.
1986) (lock-up option); GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1018, 1034-
35 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (self-tender exchange offer, by-law amendment, and employee retire-
ment plan amendment); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678, 685 (E.D. Pa.
1985) (standstill agreement); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., Nos.
353 & 354 (Del. March 13, 1986), aff'g 501 A.2d 1239 (Del. Ch. 1985) (poison pill plan,
self-tender exchange offer, no-shop provision, and lock-up option); Moran v. Household
Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1985) (poison pill rights plan); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (selective self-tender exchange offer).
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the target board. 17 Raiders and shareholders thus assert that courts
must carefully scrutinize the actions taken by a board of directors in
response to a takeover threat, because the directors might act with
self-interest to keep themselves in office by preventing a change in
ownership. 18
Courts have accepted the directors' contentions and thus have
applied the traditional fiduciary duty analysis to actions taken in re-
sponse to a takeover threat. The majority of courts accordingly do
not place an initial burden on a board of directors before they can
enjoy the presumption of the business judgment rule. t 9 These
courts require the plaintiff to first present evidence that the direc-
tors acted on an uninformed basis, in bad faith, or primarily or
solely for the purpose of preventing a change in control to keep
themselves in office. 20 If the plaintiff meets this burden, courts then
require the directors to present evidence concerning the decision's
fairness.21
The problem with using this traditional approach in the take-
17 See, e.g., Reibstein, After a Takeover: More Managers Run, or Are Pushed, Out the Door,
Wall St.J., Nov. 15, 1985, at 25, col. 3.
18 See Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Sav. & Loan, 749 F.2d 374, 376 (7th Cir. 1984);
Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 260 (2d Cir. 1984); Enterra Corp. v. SGS
Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678, 687 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
19 Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Sav. & Loan, 749 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying
Illinois law); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying
New York law); Horwitz v. Southwest Forest Indus., 604 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Nev. 1985)
(applying Nevada law); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
(applying Pennsylvania law). But see Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (initial burden on directors to
show reasonableness).
20 See, e.g., Hanson 11, 781 F.2d at 274. See also Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc.,
634 F.2d 690, 702 (2d Cir. 1980) (fact that directors would remain in control if their defen-
sive tactics were successful is not alone sufficient to shift the burden to the directors);
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 297 (7th Cir.) (even though directors might
have taken defensive action to remain in control, plaintiff failed to show it was the sole or
primary purpose), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981);Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287,
293 (3d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 629 F.2d 302 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
But see Note, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics and the BusinessJudgment Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 621,
656 (1983) (if the plaintiff shows a substantial likelihood that a raider will replace the target
directors after acquiring control, the burden shifts to the directors to show their conduct
was fair and reasonable).
21 If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie breach of the duty of due care, directors must
show evidence to the contrary or demonstrate the substantive fairness of their actions. See
Hanson 1H, 781 F.2d at 277-78 (court shifted burden to target board to justify the substan-
tive fairness of a lock-up option after finding plaintiff made a prima facie case for breach of
the duty of due care). Where a plaintiff establishes a prima facie breach of the duty of
loyalty in the takeover context, courts have indicated that directors do not have to prove
that their action was substantively fair. Rather, directors need only show that their action
was entered into for a proper or legitimate corporate purpose. See Treadway Cos. v. Care
Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 & n.47 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying NewJersey law). Norlin Corp. v.
Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264-67 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying New York law), affirmed
this position after actually shifting the burden. But see Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d
225, 233-34 (9th Cir. 1975) (under California law directors must show a compelling busi-
ness purpose). In Delaware, it appears that in light of Unocal, where directors must initially
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over context is that the plaintiff must present evidence of the direc-
tors' subjective intent, an extremely difficult burden to overcome.
In fact, most courts and commentators agree that plaintiffs in most
takeover cases cannot negate the presumption of the business judg-
ment rule.2 2 Consequently, courts often do not inquire into the
reasonableness or substantive fairness of decisions designed to pre-
vent a takeover.2 3 If courts do not require a board to show the rea-
sonableness or substantive fairness of its actions, the company and
its stockholders can suffer because the board might have prevented
a beneficial takeover. Without such a showing, directors might act
with a desire to perpetuate themselves in office under a pretext of
benefiting their company and stockholders. This concern contin-
ues to grow in light of the number of decisions upholding the ac-
tions of a target board of directors.2 4
II. An Initial Burden of Proof
Because a target board, using corporate funds, might act pri-
marily to further its own interests rather than those of the corpora-
tion and its stockholders, courts should examine the target board's
actions before conferring upon the directors the protections of the
business judgment rule. By requiring a board of directors in all
takeover situations to show that it responded reasonably to a rea-
sonably perceived threat, courts can promote a marketplace where
directors deter only takeovers that are not in the company's or
stockholders' best interest.
The Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co.25 and Moran v. Household International, Inc.2 6 recognized the need
for placing an initial burden on a board of directors in situations
involving the threat of a takeover. Although the decisions upheld
show reasonableness, that if a plaintiff shows self-interest or bad faith, the burden will shift
to the directors to show the substantive fairness of their action.
22 See generally McCord, Limiting Defensive Actions in Tender Offers: A Model Act for the Protec-
tion of Shareholder Decision Making, 21 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 489, 498 (1984); Defensive Tactics and
the Fiduciary Obligations of the Target Board, 7 J. CORP. LAw. 579, 594 (1982).
23 Commentators have criticized courts for applying the business judgment rule to di-
rectors' decisions to resist a takeover as not properly scrutinizing whether the directors
satisfied their fiduciary duties. See id. at 597-600. For a critique of Panter v. Marshall Field
& Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981), and Treadway Cos. v. Care
Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980), see Note, The Misapplication of the Business Judgment Rule
in Contests for Corporate Control, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 980, 987-96 (1982).
24 See, e.g.,Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less Drug Stores Northwest, Inc., 741 F.2d 1555 (9th Cir.
1984) (no-shop provision); Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Int'l, 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984)
(springing warrants); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1018 (1983) (treasury stock sale and lock-up option); Horwitz v. Southwest Forest
Indus., 604 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Nev. 1985) (stock purchase rights plan); Enterra Corp. v. SGS
Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (standstill agreement).
25 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
26 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
1986] NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
the target boards' defensive tactics, both evidence the judiciary's
increased concern over the sometimes drastic actions taken by di-
rectors to remove unwanted takeover threats.
In Unocal, Unocal Corporation (Unocal) used a selective self-
tender offer in response to an unsolicited tender offer by Mesa Pe-
troleum Company (Mesa).27 The Delaware court applied the busi-
ness judgment rule to determine if the Unocal board had breached
any fiduciary duties to Unocal and its stockholders by voting to use
the selective self-tender offer as a defensive tactic. 28 The court,
however, modified the rule by placing an initial burden on the Uno-
cal board before it could enjoy the presumption of the business
judgment rule. The court required the Unocal board to show that
it had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate
policy and effectiveness existed because of another person's stock
ownership 29 and, to ensure balance, that the defensive action taken
was reasonable in relation to the threat posed.30 The court ex-
plained that the initial burden on the Unocal board was necessary
in the context of a contest for corporate control because the direc-
tors might attempt to keep themselves in office by deterring a
change in control.3 '
The court determined that the Unocal board met its initial bur-
27 Mesa, owner of 13% of Unocal, made an unsolicited tender offer to the Unocal
stockholders offering to buy 37%o of Unocal stock for $54 per share. 493 A.2d at 949.
Once it owned 51% of Unocal, Mesa planned to merge the companies, providing the re-
maining Unocal shareholders with highly subordinated debentures purportedly worth $54
each. Id. The Unocal board of directors voted to reject Mesa's offer as "inadequate and
coercive." Id. The Unocal board decided to instead make a tender offer to its own share-
holders for 49% of Unocal's stock in exchange for $72 worth of senior secured debt for
each share tendered. Id. at 951. More importantly, the board excluded Mesa from its offer.
Id. Mesa immediately filed suit claiming the Unocal board violated its fiduciary duties when
it voted to pursue the selective self-tender offer in response to Mesa's front-end loaded,
two-tier offer. Id. at 951-52.
28 Id. at 954 (directors may rely on the protection of the business judgment rule for
decisions to defend against a takeover threat) (citing Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627
(Del. 1984)).
29 493 A.2d at 955. The court added that the directors "satisfy that burden by showing
good faith and reasonable investigation." Id. (citing Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 555
(Del. 1964)). The Delaware court's subsequent decision in laran indicates that the per-
ceived danger did not necessarily have to result from "another person's stock ownership."
See notes 34-41 infra and accompanying text.
30 493 A.2d at 955.
31 Id. at 954. The court noted that directors' decisions made in the face of a pending
takeover bid "should be no less entitled to the respect they otherwise would be accorded in
the realm of business judgment." Id. It added, however, that "[b]ecause of the omnipres-
ent spector that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of
the corporation and its shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial
examination at the threshold before the protections of the business judgment rule may be
conferred." Id. See also Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962) ("The directors
are of necessity confronted with a conflict of interest, and an objective decision is
difficult.").
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den and thus could rely on the presumption of the business judg-
ment rule.3 2 After shifting the burden back to Mesa, the court
found that Mesa failed to show that the Unocal board did not act in
the best interests of the company and its shareholders.3 3 Accord-
ingly, the court concluded that the Unocal board did not breach
either of its fiduciary duties.
In Moran, the Delaware Supreme Court extended the Unocal
analysis to a situation in which a board took action even though no
actual tender offer had been made. The board of Household Inter-
national, Inc. (Household) voted to adopt a rights plan in response
to fears that Household might be vulnerable to an unfriendly take-
over.3 4 The board explained that it was concerned that a takeover
might involve front-end loaded, two-tier tender offers and bust-up
takeovers that would harm Household, its stockholders, and its
employees.35
Moran, a dissenting board member and Household stock-
holder, filed suit to invalidate the plan.3 6 After finding that the
Household board had the statutory power to adopt the rights
plan,37 the court concluded that the board did not breach any fidu-
ciary duties.3 8 Relying primarily on the Unocal holding, the court
permitted the board to assert the business judgment rule because
the board met its initial burden.39 The court found that the direc-
tors had reasonable grounds for believing Household was vulnera-
ble to bust-up takeovers and coercive acquisition techniques, and
32 493 A.2d at 958.
33 Id. at 958-59.
34 500 A.2d at 1349. For a description of the "rights plan," see notes 141-46 infra and
accompanying text.
35 The board was concerned with the increased frequency of bust-up takeovers and
front-end loaded, two-tier tender offers which could harm Household and its stockholders.
500 A.2d at 1349.
36 Id.
37 Before addressing the fiduciary duty issue, the court made four other findings. First,
the court found that §§ 151 and 157 of Delaware General Corporate Law gave the board
the power to implement the rights plan. Id. at 1351-53. Second, the court found §§ 151
and 157 constitutional. The court explained that a board acting pursuant to a state statute
provides an insufficient nexus for it to find the necessary state action for a commerce clause
challenge or supremacy clause violation in light of the Williams Act. Id. at 1353. Third, the
court found that shareholder approval was not needed to implement the rights plan be-
cause it did not change Household's fundamental structure. Id. at 1354. Fourth, the court
found that the rights plan did not restrict a shareholder's ability to conduct a proxy contest.
Id. at 1355. For other decisions upholding the validity of various poison pill rights plans,
see Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., Nos. 353 & 354 (Del. March 13,
1986), aff'g 501 A.2d 1239 (Del. Ch. 1985); Horwitz v. Southwest Forest Indus., 604 F.
Supp. 1130 (D. Nev. 1985). See also Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and Two-Tiered
Takeovers: The "Poison Pill" Preferred, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1964 (1984). But see Dynamics Corp.
v. CTS Corp., Nos. 85-1601, 86-1608 (7th Cir. June 9, 1986).
38 500 A.2d at 1357.
39 Id. at 1356-57.
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that the rights plan was a reasonable defensive mechanism to pro-
tect the company.40 Moran failed to rebut the presumption of the
business judgment rule, and thus the court concluded that the
Household board did not breach its fiduciary duties. 4 1
Unless courts are willing to scrutinize more closely a plaintiff's
contentions of breach of fiduciary duty,4 2 courts should place an
initial reasonableness burden on directors, as the Delaware
Supreme Court has done, before conferring the protection of the
business judgment rule. Such a requirement better assures that the
directors' true motive in adopting a defensive tactic was to protect
their company and its shareholders. At the same time, courts
should defer to directors' expertise and broad authority to act on
behalf of their company and its shareholders. Courts should also
avoid substituting their judgment for that of the directors by only
inquiring into whether the directors' actions were reasonable under
the circumstances.
III. Determining Reasonableness
Before granting the protection of the business judgment rule
in a takeover context, courts should require the directors to show
that they had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to cor-
porate policy and effectiveness existed and, to ensure balance, that
the defensive action taken was reasonable in relation to the threat
posed.43 As a part of their overall reasonableness burden, directors
should initially prove they made a reasonable investigation into
both the existence of a danger and the need for, and effectiveness
of, defensive action to remove the perceived danger.44 To demon-
strate the danger to the corporation, a board may present evidence
of the inadequacy of the bidder's tender offer, the coercive nature
of an unsolicited bid, or the potential adverse impact a takeover
might have on a target's employees, creditors, customers, and per-
haps even the local community. 45
Finally, a board can show that a defensive tactic was reasonable
40 Id. at 1357. The court suggested that the rights plan could prevent the coercive
nature of bust-up takeovers and front-end loaded, two-tier tender offers by making an un-
wanted takeover more difficult. Although the court did not explain how the plan would
make takeovers posing a danger more difficult, the plan apparently had this effect because it
increased the cost of acquiring control of Household by several billion dollars.
41 Id.
42 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did carefully scrutinize a target board
decision in Hanson 11, 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986). The Second Circuit, applying the tradi-
tional fiduciary duty analysis, enjoined a lock-up option the target board granted to a white
knight in response to an unsolicited tender offer.
43 See 493 A.2d at 955.
44 See notes 47-76 infra and accompanying text.
45 See notes 77-131 infra and accompanying text.
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in relation to the danger posed by showing that the action taken
removed an existing danger or deterred a potential danger from
occurring, and was no more extensive than necessary.46 By requir-
ing the directors to meet this initial burden, courts can better as-
sure that the board's actions truly benefit the company and its
stockholders.
A. Reasonable Investigation
To determine whether directors have met their initial reasona-
bleness burden, courts should consider whether a board made a
reasonable investigation into the existence and impact of a danger
and into the possible need for, and effectiveness of, defensive ac-
tion.47 Courts should not allow directors to simply assert that they
relied on the analysis and recommendation of their legal counsel
and investment bankers. Rather, courts should require the direc-
tors to show that they made an affirmative effort to understand the
nature of the threat to the company as well as the details and effec-
tiveness of any defensive action.
In Moran, the court indicated that the Household board had
adequately informed itself of Household's vulnerability to the dan-
gers of bust-up takeovers and coercive acquisition tactics and the
details and effectiveness of the rights plan.48 The court found that
the board had conducted .financial studies showing Household's
vulnerability, information that included a three-page summary of
the rights plan and various articles on the current takeover environ-
ment.49 Additionally, before the directors approved the plan, they
had extensive discussions with their legal counsel and investment
bankers which reflected a full and candid evaluation and critique of
the plan.50 These important facts influenced the court's finding
that the directors made a reasonable investigation. 51
46 See notes 132-57 infra and accompanying text.
47 The Unocal court indicated that directors meet their reasonable grounds for believ-
ing a danger existed burden by showing "good faith and reasonable investigation." See
note 29 supra. The court added that such proof is materially enhanced where a board com-
prised of a majority of outside independent directors approves the action. See 493 A.2d at
955. But see Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 266 n.12 (2d Cir. 1984) ("We
are not persuaded that a different test applies to 'independent' as opposed to 'inside' direc-
tors under the business judgment rule.").
48 For a description of the rights plan, see notes 141-46 infra and accompanying text.
49 500 A.2d at 1356.
50 Id.
51 The court found that the directors acted on an informed basis because they received
a "knowledgeable critique" of the plan and were not "grossly negligent." Id. The court
concluded that the directors reasonably believed Household was vulnerable to bust-up
takeovers and coercive acquisition techniques and adopted a reasonable defensive measure.
Id. at 1357.
1986] NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
In Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc.5 2 (Hanson II),
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also con-
sidered whether a target board had adequately informed itself
before adopting a defensive tactic. Although the court did not
place an initial burden on the target board,53 it rejected the argu-
ment that the directors had an absolute right to rely on financial
and legal advisors. 54
In Hanson, Hanson Trust PLC (Hanson) made an unsolicited
$60 cash tender offer to the common stockholders of SCM Corpo-
ration (SCM). 55 In response, SCM's counsel advised the board to
secure an offer from a white knight.56 Nine outside directors on the
SCM board unanimously approved a $70 merger agreement with
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., and its related entities
(Merrill Lynch).5 7 Hanson responded by raising its offer to $72
cash per share for all of SCM's common stock, conditioned on SCM
not granting anyone a lock-up option to purchase corporate as-
sets.58 The SCM and Merrill Lynch management immediately ter-
minated the $70 agreement. 59 Under a new merger agreement,
Merrill Lynch, through a corporate shell called ML SCM Acquisi-
tion, Inc., would first make a $74 per share cash tender offer for
eighty percent of SCM's outstanding common shares.60 A second-
step merger was to follow in which the remaining twenty percent of
SCM shareholders were to receive debentures valued at $74 per
share. 61
As consideration for the new agreement, the SCM directors
granted Merrill Lynch an irrevocable asset option to purchase
SCM's two most profitable divisions, conditioned on a third party
acquiring more than one-third of SCM's common stock.62 In agree-
52 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
53 The court, citing Unocal, noted that although "in other jurisdictions, directors may
not enjoy the same presumptions per the business judgment rule, at least in a takeover
context .... under New York law, the initial burden of proving directors' breach of fiduciary
duty rests with the plaintiff." Id. at 273.
54 Id. at 275.
55 Id. at 268.
56 Id. at 269. A target board faced with a hostile takeover bid might attempt to find
another bidder it prefers, commonly referred to as a white knight, to negotiate with on
friendly terms.
57 Id. at 270. SCM and Merrill Lynch agreed that Merrill Lynch, through a corporate
shell, ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., would make a $70 cash tender offer for approximately
85% of SCM's common stock. A second-step merger would follow in which the remaining
shareholders would receive $59.50 per share in cash and $10.50 in new debentures. Id. at
269.




62 Merrill Lynch made it clear that it would not proceed without the asset option. Id.
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ing to the asset lock-up option, the SCM board relied on the com-
pany's financial advisor's statements that the $74 offer was the best
available and that the option price was fair to SCM stockholders. 63
The board also relied on counsel's opinion that the decision to ap-
prove the agreement was within the discretion of the board's busi-
ness judgment. 64
Hanson, concerned that SCM would be a financially unattrac-
tive company without the two major divisions, brought an action to
restrain Merrill Lynch from exercising its asset lock-up option.65
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, applying New York
law, granted the preliminary injunction. 66 The SCM board argued
that it made an informed decision because it relied on the advice of
legal and financial advisors that the options were "within the range
of fair value." The Second Circuit rejected this argument. The
court recognized that "while directors are protected to the extent
that their actions evidence their business judgment, such protection
assumes that courts must not reflexively decline to consider the
Under the proposed agreement, Merrill Lynch had the irrevocable right to purchase SCM's
pigments business for $350 million and Durkee Famous Foods for $80 million. Id. The
principle advantage of a lock-up option is that it can induce an otherwise reluctant bidder to
enter a bidding contest as a white knight and thus ultimately benefit target shareholders.
An option might enhance a white knight's chance of success by making a company finan-
cially unattractive and deterring unfriendly bidders. The option also serves as insurance
against failure because if a raider should prevail, a white knight can exercise a generally
favorable option. See Note, Lock-up Options: Toward a State Law Standard, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1068, 1078 (1983). Lock-up options are not per se illegal, but are permissible if the option
is reasonably structured to draw another bidder into the contest, and impermissible if it is
calculated primarily to exclude hostile parties from the auction. See 781 F.2d at 274. But see
Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981) (lock-up options constitute
"manipulation" within anti-fraud provision of Williams Act). To determine whether a par-
ticular lock-up option is beneficial to shareholders and thus should be upheld, one com-
mentator has proposed a list of factors: (1) the extent of the bidding advantage conferred
by the option; (2) whether a conscientious negotiator could have, at the time the deal was
made, reasonably construed the arrangement as beneficial to the target company and its
shareholders; (3) the extent to which a white knight's offer is an improvement over the
terms of a raider's offer; (4) whether the target board held out for the best deal it could get
for shareholders, or merely accepted the terms offered by a white knight; and (5) the scope
of the target board's efforts to locate another white knight willing to accept terms more
favorable to the target company. See Note, supra, at 1078-81.
63 The investment banking firm, Goldman Sachs & Co., advised the SCM board that
"the $74 offer was the best available, and was fair to SCM shareholders." 781 F.2d at 271.
In a later letter, Goldman Sachs & Co. confirmed that the option prices were "within the
range of fair value," and that the Merrill Lynch offer was "worth $1.25 to $1.50 more per
share [to SCM shareholders] than the Hanson $72 cash [tender] offer .... Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 272. In response to Merrill Lynch's $74 tender offer, Hanson terminated its
$72 offer and increased its SCM holdings to 37%. Id. at 271-72. This triggered Merrill
Lynch's right to exercise the option. Id. at 272. Hanson then filed suit and announced a
$75 cash offer conditioned on judicial invalidation or withdrawal of the option right. Id.
Merrill Lynch immediately announced it was exercising the option. Id.
66 Id. at 283.
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content of their 'judgment' and the extent of the information on
which it is based." 67 Thus, the court concluded that the plaintiff
rebutted the presumption of the business judgment rule.68
The court correctly stated that directors must make their deci-
sion "on the basis of 'reasonable diligence' in gathering and consid-
ering material information."69 The court added that a board has
"some oversight obligations to become reasonably familiar with an
opinion, report, or other source of advice before becoming entitled
to rely on it."70 Because the directors did not use reasonable dili-
gence to inform themselves of the contents of the reports, the court
found that they were not entitled to rely on them to meet their duty
of due care. 71 The court concluded that the directors failed to pres-
ent legally sufficient evidence to the contrary72 or to justify the fair-
ness of the option.73
Unfortunately, other courts have suggested that directors may
simply rely on the advice of their financial and legal advisors with-
out inquiring into the details or basis of the advice and its impact
on the company and shareholders. In Horwitz v. Southwest Forest In-
dustries,74 advisors informed the board of Southwest Forest Indus-
tries (SFI) that a stock purchase rights plan was in the company and
stockholders' best interests because it would deter unfair and inad-
67 Id. at 275.
68 Id. at 277.
69 Id. at 274.
70 Id. at 275.
71 The court did not apply the gross negligence standard for the duty of due care enun-
ciated in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985). But the court still found
that "the SCM directors failed to take many of the affirmative directorial steps that underlie
[a] finding of due care .... ." 781 F.2d at 275. The court noted that the board did not
even obtain a written opinion from its investment banker as to the value of the two busi-
nesses which were the subject of the option. Id. Moreover, the board never asked what the
top value was, or why the two businesses generating half of SCM's income were being sold
for one-third of SCM's total purchase price. Id. Thus, the court concluded that "the SCM
directors' paucity of information and their swiftness of decision-making strongly suggest a
breach of the duty of due care." Id. The court found that the directors did not become
reasonably familiar with Goldman Sach's conclusion that the prices of the options were fair.
Id. at 276. The court explained that if the directors had inquired about the "range of fair
value," Goldman Sachs would have told them that it did not investigate the range of fair
value. Id. Thus, the court concluded that the "directors might have then discovered that
the [option] prices represented lower valuations than their own experienced business judg-
ment would allow them to approve." Id.
72 The court reached its finding even though it did not find any evidence that the direc-
tors acted with self-interest or fraud. Id. at 276-77.
73 In applying price earnings ratios and using SCM's own valuation charts, the court
found that the actual value of the pigments division was between $420 and $544 million.
Id. at 279. Regarding the Durkee Famous Foods business, the court also found evidence
that it was optioned at a price significantly below its fair value. Id. at 280. The court also
rejected the SCM directors' arguments that the purpose of the option was to achieve a
better bid for shareholders and that the option facilitated competition in the market for
control of SCM. See id. at 281-83.
74 604 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Nev. 1985).
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equate unsolicited tender offers.7 5 The court stated that the direc-
tors had a right to rely on the advice of investment bankers and
legal counsel. 76 The court did not condition this right on the direc-
tors making a reasonable investigation.
Often legal counsel and investment bankers are an asset to a
board of directors faced with a possible danger to the corporation
and stockholders. On the other hand, a tender offer may provide
shareholders with an opportunity to enjoy a profit. Thus, courts
must require directors to show that they made a reasonable investi-
gation into the circumstances surrounding a possible takeover
threat. The directors can meet this requirement by analyzing advi-
sors' opinions and recommendations to understand the basis for
the conclusion that a genuine danger exists, the need for and de-
tails of any proposed action, and the likelihood that the action, if
taken, will remove the danger.
B. Dangers Posed to Target Companies
After requiring directors to show that they made a reasonable
investigation, courts should, as part of directors' initial reasonable-
ness burden, require the directors to present evidence of the per-
ceived danger. These concerns most often involve inadequacy of
price, coercive acquisition techniques, and employee welfare.
1. Inadequacy of Price
Courts generally allow directors to determine whether a tender
offer is inadequate, and if appropriate, to take action to protect the
company and shareholders. Although such deference is proper,
courts must require the directors to show that the perceived danger
was genuine by presenting evidence which establishes a reasonable
basis for the directors' conclusion that the offer was inadequate.
The Unocal court, in addressing the directors' burden of show-
75 The SFI advisors reasoned that because the board planned to develop the company,
a defensive tactic to deter unsolicited tender offers was in the company's and shareholders'
best interest. Id. at 1132-34.
76 Id. at 1134-35. The court declined to issue a preliminary injunction to prohibit the
SF1 board from taking any action in furtherance of the stock rights plan, a type of poison
pill. Id. at 1136. The court found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate probable success
on the merits of the breach of fiduciary duty claim. Id. See also Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden
Corp., 555 F. Supp. 892 (W.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018
(1983). In Buffalo Forge, a successful tender offeror brought suit to rescind a treasury stock
sale and a purchase option that the former Ogden directors gave to a competing tender
offeror. Buffalo Forge asserted that the former directors breached their fiduciary duties.
555 F. Supp. at 895-96. The court found that under New York law, the directors were
entitled to rely on the advice of their financial advisor that the transactions with the compet-
ing tender offeror were fair to the company and in compliance with their fiduciary duties.
Id. at 904. The court stated that "[r]eliance upon the attorney's advice, even when un-
sound, is not a breach of fiduciary duty.' Id.
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ing reasonable grounds for perceiving a danger, recognized that
such danger may include inadequacy of the price offered. 77 Uno-
cal's investment bankers concluded that Mesa's offer was wholly in-
adequate, as well as coercive. 78 The financial analysts based their
determination on the minimum cash value per share that Unocal
could expect from a sale or liquidation, concluding that this liquida-
tion value exceeded Mesa's offer.79
In Unocal, though Mesa's offer was inadequate, Mesa did not
have express plans to sell Unocal after acquiring control. When a
raider clearly expresses an intent to bust up a target company, the
danger and unfairness to shareholders becomes even more readily
apparent. In bust-up takeovers, the raider offers shareholders
more than the stock's current trading price but below the com-
pany's per share break-up or liquidation value.80 By selling major
divisions to pay their acquisition indebtedness, raiders are able to
obtain the remaining divisions at virtually no cost. The gain to the
raider's shareholders is to the target shareholders' detriment. The
target board might as well sell the company in pieces, distributing
the proceeds to shareholders. Thus, a raider's initial offer, which
exceeded the stock's market price, is actually inadequate.
Recent cases illustrate the unfairness to shareholders. In Rev-
lon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,81 Pantry Pride, an un-
friendly bidder, planned to acquire Revlon by using junk bonds and
eventually breaking up Revlon.8 2 The Delaware Supreme Court
gave considerable weight to evidence demonstrating that if the Rev-
lon board sold the company's divisions separately, the board could
expect more per share than that offered by Pantry Pride, an affiliate
of MacAndrews & Forbes.8 3
77 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
78 Id. at 950-5 1.
79 Unocal's investment bankers, Goldman Sachs & Co. and Dillon Reed & Co., ex-
pressed their opinion that the minimum cash value that Unocal shareholders could expect
from a sale or orderly liquidation of Unocal, for 100% of its stock, exceeded $60 per share.
Id. at 950. Mesa only offered $54 per share. Id. at 949.
80 See GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1018 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (a
bust-up takeover refers to a tender offeror's attempt to finance its acquisition by using the
target's own assets and borrowing capacity); Moran, 500 A.2d at 1349 n.4.
81 Nos. 353 & 354 (Del. March 13, 1986), aff'g 501 A.2d 1239 (Del. Ch. 1985).
82 Revlon's investment banker told the board that Pantry Pride would finance its tender
offer with junk-bonds and then would sell Revlon's business divisions separately to pay the
indebtedness while still realizing a profit. Revlon, slip op. at 5. The investment banker
informed the board that Pantry Pride's $45 offer was grossly inadequate. The investment
banker reasoned that according to their analysis, if Revlon's business divisions were sold
separately, and at the proper time, the shareholders could realize between $60 and $70 per
share. Id. at 4-5.
83 The court noted that when the Revlon board concluded that Pantry Pride's tender
offer was "grossly inadequate," they implemented defensive measures "in good faith, and
on an informed basis, with reasonable grounds to believe that there existed a harmful
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In GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp.,84 the unfriendly bidder,
GAF Corporation (GAF), made clear its intentions to bust up large
segments of Union Carbide Corporation (Union Carbide) to pay its
acquisition costs after acquiring control.8 5 The Union Carbide
board concluded that a proposed tender offer and accompanying
liquidation plan by GAF was "grossly inadequate and unfair and
not in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders."8 6
The board reached its conclusion after its investment banker
presented a valuation analysis containing the range of values that
Union Carbide shareholders might realize if Union Carbide were
liquidated. 87 Because the values per share were greater than GAF's
offer, GAF would have acquired Union Carbide's valuable gas,
chemicals, and plastics businesses at virtually no cost.88
To remove the danger of the inadequate offer, the Union Car-
bide board pursued a self-tender exchange offer and amended the
company's pension plan.89 The Union Carbide board argued that
its self-tender exchange offer was designed to ensure that profits
from its business operations would flow through to the sharehold-
ers of Union Carbide, rather than to the shareholders of GAF.90
The district court upheld these tactics, 91 explaining that deterring
an inadequate offer is entirely legitimate.9 2 A hostile tender of-
feror, the court stated, is not entitled to have a target board smooth
the path to control. Instead, the bidder must establish the ade-
threat to the corporate enterprise." Id. at 14, 16. The court upheld a poison pill plan and a
self-tender exchange offer but enjoined a lock-up option.
84 624 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
85 Id. at 1017.
86 Id. GAF had made an unsolicited tender offer to Union Carbide shareholders offer-
ing to purchase 80% of Union Carbide for $68 per share. Id. at 1017, 1025. GAF condi-
tioned the offer on its receipt of a desired number of shares and the funds to finance the
purchases. Id. One of the board's defensive actions was to pursue a self-tender exchange
offer of high interest debentures and some cash as an alternative to GAF's offer. Id. The
board decided not to make the self-tender selective, and thus included GAF in its offer.
The board additionally amended the company's retirement plan. Id. at 1022, 1024-25.
87 Union Carbide's investment banker, Morgan Stanley, found that in each case GAF's
$68 offer was unfair to shareholders from a financial viewpoint. Id. at 1030. The board also
found that the tender offer posed a danger to Union Carbide employees.
88 Id. at 1020, 1030.
89 See note 86 supra.
90 624 F. Supp. at 1020.
91 The court found that the board acted within its legal authority under New York Cor-
poration Law, and that the only question, one involving credibility, was whether the actions
taken were based on the "informed reasonable judgment of an admittedly independent
Board with no personal interests at stake." Id. at 1019. The court concluded that the
Union Carbide directors did not breach their fiduciary duties to their company and its
shareholders. Id. at 1020, 1035.
92 Id. at 1020. The court accepted the Union Carbide board's contention that its self-
tender exchange offer would ensure that profits flow to Union Carbide's shareholders,
rather than to the shareholders of GAF. Id. at 1020, 1035.
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quacy of the price offered. 93
The Delaware Supreme Court in M added an important
dimension to inadequacy analysis. In Moran, the court considered
the mere frequency of bust-up takeovers and front-end loaded, two-
tier tender offers in Household's industry to show that a danger
existed.9 5 The court accepted the Household board's contention
that the availability and increased use of these takeover tactics
posed a genuine danger to shareholders.
In Moran, financial studies showed that Household's stock was
significantly undervalued in relation to the company's potential
break-up value. This made Household vulnerable to a bust-up
takeover. The Household board implemented a rights plan in a
good faith belief that such a plan was necessary to protect House-
hold shareholders. 96 The court concluded that a board can estab-
lish a danger existed by showing that the company is vulnerable to
takeover techniques designed to give raiders a windfall to the detri-
ment of shareholders. 97
Courts should permit directors to assert that a tender offer was
inadequate to show that a genuine danger to the company and
shareholders existed. Some courts have allowed such an assertion
without much of an evidentiary basis. 98 Courts should, however,
require directors to present evidence establishing some verifiable
financial analysis as a basis for their conclusion, especially where
there is no offer, as in Moran, to compare to the company's break-
up value. In such cases, courts should require target directors to
show some certainty of the danger and the connection to the target
company. Moreover, as the Moran court recognized, where a board
takes pre-takeover action in response to the possibility of a future
inadequate offer, the action does not change the board's duty to
evaluate an offer made at a later time.99
93 Id. at 1020.
94 See notes 26, 34-41 supra and accompanying text.
95 500 A.2d at 1349, 1357.
96 Id. at 1348-49.
97 Id. at 1357.
98 See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981). In Panter, the board of Marshall Field & Co. issued a press release stating that
Panter's $36 tender offer was inadequate. The court held that no reasonable juror could
find that the press release was "deceptive" within § 14(e) of the Williams Act. Id. at 290.
The Seventh Circuit considered evidence that the board merely believed it could obtain a
higher price and that a foreign company might, at any time, make a $60 offer. Id. See also
Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980) (suggesting that a tender
offer may be inadequate when the tender offer is only within several dollars of the target
stock's market price).
99 See notes 139-57 infra and accompanying text.
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2. Coercive Acquisition Techniques
Coercive acquisition techniques such as front-end loaded, two-
tier tender offers 00 disrupt the marketplace by favoring bidders
and pose a genuine danger to a target company and its stockhold-
ers. Thus, courts should allow directors to assert the use of such a
takeover tactic to meet the danger requirement of their initial rea-
sonableness burden.
In Unocal, Mesa's offer took the form of a front-end loaded,
two-tier tender offer, where Mesa in the first tier offered to buy
thirty-seven percent of Unocal's stock for $54 cash.10' With fifty-
one percent control, Mesa planned to merge with Unocal in the
back end, issuing highly subordinated debt securities to the remain-
ing forty-nine percent of Unocal shareholders in exchange for their
shares. 10 2 The full Unocal Board voted to reject Mesa's offer, not
only because it was inadequate in price, but because it was coercive
in nature.10 3
Front-end loaded, two-tier tender offers coerce shareholders
into tendering in the first tier tender offer to avoid receiving securi-
ties in the second tier, back-end merger worth less than the consid-
eration offered in the first tier. This creates a danger to target
shareholders because it coerces them to tender in the first tier re-
gardless of the adequacy of the offer. 10 4
The Unocal court acknowledged this danger, explaining that
"[i]t is now well recognized that such offers are a classic coercive
measure designed to stampede shareholders into tendering at the
100 A front-end loaded, two-tier tender offer is a two-step acquisition technique where in
the first-step, front-end offer, the raider usually offers cash. In the second-step, back-end
merger, the remaining target shareholders receive securities of the bidder valued below the
consideration offered in the first-step tender offer. Thus, the acquisition is front-end
loaded. In many cases the front-end offer is also inadequate. The merger is certain to
occur because the bidder will vote its controlling shares. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956;
Mirvis, Two-Tier Pricing: Some Appraisal and "Entire Fairness" Valuation Issues, 38 Bus. LAw. 485
(1983); Note, Front-End Loaded Tender Offers: The Application of Federal and State Law to an
Innovative Corporate Acquisition Technique, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 389 (1982).
101 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949.
102 Id. As evidence that the back-end securities were not worth $54 per share, the Dela-
ware court noted that the District Court for the Central District of California entered an
order requiring Mesa to issue a supplemental proxy statement to Unocal shareholders. Id.
The statement had to disclose that the securities it planned to offer in the back-end merger
of its two-tier tender offer were highly subordinated and that Unocal's capitalization would
differ significantly from its then present structure. Id. at 949-50.
103 Id. at 950, 953. Unocal's investment banker provided an opinion stating that Uno-
cal's per share liquidation value exceeded $60 compared to Mesa's purported $54 per share
offer. Id. at 950.
104 See Comment, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.: The Selective Self-Tender-Fighting
Fire With Fire, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109 (1985); Comment, The Front-End Loaded, Two-
Tiered Tender Offer, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 811 (1983). See also Dennis, Two-Tiered Tender Offers and
Greenmail: Is New Legislation Needed?, 19 GA. L. REv. 281 (1985) (two-tier tender offers are
not detrimental to shareholders).
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first tier, even if the price is inadequate, out of fear of what they will
receive at the back end of the transaction."' 10 5 The court also found
that the Unocal board feared for the interests of shareholders in the
back-end merger who were to receive inadequate consideration in
the form of highly subordinated debt securities. 10 6
Takeover techniques such as front-end loaded, two-tier tender
offers coerce shareholders to tender without making an informed
decision. Board action is necessary to protect the interests of
shareholders. Courts should allow directors to fulfill the danger el-
ement of their initial reasonableness burden by presenting evidence
that a bidder employed a tactic designed to coerce shareholders to
tender when it is not in their best interest.
3. Protection of Employee Welfare
In addition to protecting the company and its stockholders, di-
rectors might institute defensive tactics to protect the welfare of the
target company's employees, creditors, suppliers, and possibly even
local communities.' 0 7 A reasonably perceived danger to these par-
ties should serve as a basis for the danger element of the directors
initial reasonableness burden.
The court in Union Carbide 10 8 gave considerable weight to the
directors' concerns for employees in finding that the Union Carbide
board did not breach its fiduciary duties by taking action in re-
sponse to GAF's unsolicited tender offer. 109 GAF had expressed its
intention to sell parts of Union Carbide after gaining control. In
addition to pursuing a self-tender offer, the Union Carbide board
voted to amend the company's retirement plan. 110 The amendment
vested certain funds in participating employees in the event that a
change in control occurred."' The board intended to prevent the
105 493 A.2d at 956. See also Horwitz v. Southwest Forest Indus., 604 F. Supp. 1130,
1133 (D. Nev. 1985).
106 493 A.2d at 956-57. The court noted the selective self-tender offer was reasonable
and consistent with the board's duty to ensure that the back-end minority shareholders
received value equal to that given to the shareholders in the front end.
107 The Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal stated that "such concerns may include...
the impact on 'constituencies' other than shareholders [that is] creditors, customers, em-
ployees, and perhaps even the community generally ... " Id. at 955. See generally Brecher,
Lazarus & Gray, The Function of Employee Retirement Plans as an Impediment to Takeovers, 38 Bus.
LAw. 503 (1983). In light of the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Revlon, however,
when a bidder poses an unavoidable danger a board cannot allow employee concerns to
influence their decision to pursue action. See note 159 infra.
108 See notes 84-93 supra and accompanying text.
109 624 F. Supp. at 1019-20, 1035.
110 Id. at 1022, 1024-25.
111 The term "pension parachute" refers to the Union Carbide board's amendment to
the company's retirement plan that permitted it to vest, for the benefit of participating and
retired employees, corporate funds that were technically "in excess," in the event of an
unfriendly change in control. Id.
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new owners from using the funds to finance their takeover to the
detriment of employees. 112 GAF brought suit to enjoin the self-
tender exchange offer and the pension plan amendments.
The district court stressed that courts should not ignore the
welfare of loyal employees. 113 The court noted that directors
"might wish to assure fair and equitable recognition and treatment
for its relationships with pensioners, employees and manage-
ment"11 4 and that "[t]hese legitimate concerns... need not be left
to the goodwill of an unfriendly acquirer of corporate control."" 15
The court determined that the Union Carbide board acted "within
the wide latitude of management authority conferred on a Board of
Directors by New York law and may be considered under the Busi-
ness Judgment Rule."" 6
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania in Enterra Corp. v. SGS AssociatesI 7 also looked to em-
ployee welfare in upholding the validity of a standstill agree-
ment.118 The court went so far as to suggest that it would accept
the contention that such a defensive tactic might stabilize relations
with "various suppliers, customers, and lenders" in addition to pro-
moting the "retention (and recruitment) of key employees."119
Courts must make certain that board action purportedly taken
112 Id. at 1022.
113 Id. at 1019.
114 Id. at 1018-19.
115 Id. at 1020. The court observed that employees, pensioners, and loyal members of
management are regularly accorded protection and security when a business is moved or
substantially liquidated. Id. at 1019. The court noted that such persons are similarly af-
fected by unfriendly raids on control of a company. Id.
116 Id. at 1018. The court accepted as reasonable the board's contention that it wanted
to assure fair and equitable treatment to its pensioners, employees, and management. Id. at
1018-20, 1035.
117 600 F. Supp. 678 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
118 SGS Associates (SGS) held a substantial percentage of the outstanding shares of En-
terra Corp. (Enterra). Id. at 682. The Enterra board, as a defense tactic, reached a stand-
still agreement with SGS. This standstill agreement provided that SGS could not acquire
more than 15% of Enterra's outstanding shares and could not make a tender offer to En-
terra shareholders. Id. The agreement thus prevented SGS from attempting to acquire
control of Enterra. SGS subsequently attempted to acquire all the outstanding Enterra
shares, subject to board approval. Id. at 682-83. The Enterra board, relying on the advice
of its investment bankers, concluded that SGS' tender offer was financially inadequate and
refused to amend the agreement. Id. at 683, 690. The court found that the board did not
breach its fiduciary duties when it entered into the agreement and later rejected SGS' pro-
posal for modification of the standstill agreement. Id. at 689.
119 Id. The court noted that "[a]lthough, as with all actions taken by a board of direc-
tors, retention of control arguably was a motive for entering into the [standstill] Agree-
ment, it is clear that the primary purpose of the [b]oard ... was to 'create a stable, certain,
and cooperative relationship between management [and] a substantial shareholder.'" Id.
Thus, the court determined that the board's decision refusing to modify the standstill
agreement in an effort to protect shareholders from an inadequate offer was within the
board's business judgment. Id.
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for employee welfare is not a disguised attempt to keep the direc-
tors in office. In Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc.,120 the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the Norlin board's pur-
pose in creating an employee stock option plan and trust (ESOP)
was "not to benefit the employees but rather to solidify manage-
ment's control of the company."' 121 Thus, the court concluded that
the board failed to meet its fiduciary duty of loyalty.1 22
In the case, the Norlin board transferred newly issued stock
into the ESOP, but retained beneficial ownership and thus voting
rights of the shares. 123 This increased the board's holdings to
forty-nine percent of the company's outstanding stock, which
served to deter raiders.1 24 Affirming the district court's injunction
preventing the board from voting the newly issued stock,' 25 the
court explained that the timing of the ESOP's creation, the identity
of the trustees, and the voting control of the ESOP shares indicated
that "the ESOP was created solely as a tool of management self-
perpetuation" and not to protect employees from a genuine
danger. 126
Similarly, in Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc.,' 27 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York issued a
preliminary injunction preventing the AMF board from granting
favorable stock options to employees. The board of AMF, in re-
sponse to Minstar's unsolicited tender offer, amended the com-
pany's stock option and long-term incentive plan. 128  The
amendments granted AMF employees options to purchase AMF
stock at favorable prices, conditioned on the consummation of a
tender offer.' 29 The AMF board asserted that the amendments
120 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984).
121 Id. at 265. Piezo Electric Products, in conjunction with Rooney, Pace, began buying
large blocks of Norlin stock, bringing their total ownership to 32%. Id. at 259. The Norlin
Corp. directors voted to take defensive action in response to the fear that their company
might soon be the target of an unsolicited takeover attempt. Their action included the
creation of an ESOP. Id.
122 Id. at 266-67.
123 The board appointed three Norlin board members as trustees of the plan. Id. at 259.
The board then transferred 185,000 shares of newly issued common stock into the ESOP in
consideration for a promissory note. Id. By retaining beneficial ownership, the board effec-
tively retained voting control of the shares it conveyed to the ESOP. Id.
124 Id.
125 The court affirmed the district court's finding that the illegality of voting the newly
issued stock transferred to a wholly owned subsidiary and the ESOP had been demon-
strated with sufficient certainty to warrant injunctive relief. Id. at 267, 269.
126 Id. at 266.
127 621 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
128 Id. at 1255.
129 Originally, the board planned to grant the options based upon stated employee per-
formance objectives over a particular period. Id. Subsequent amendments dropped the
performance requirements. Instead, a tender offer triggered the options. Id. at 1256.
Holders could exercise the stock rights at either the highest price paid in a tender offer in
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were intended to calm employee fears created by hostile takeover
attempts and to safeguard rights and benefits already promised to
AMF employees.' 30 The court, however, rejected these conten-
tions. The court found that conditioning the option rights upon a
change in control "raises a strong inference that AMF's board acted
only to entrench itself."''
Courts must recognize the legitimate concerns for employees
of a target company, but must also require directors to demonstrate
a genuine danger. If the directors meet this burden, and there is no
evidence of self-dealing, courts should find that the directors ful-
filled the danger element of their initial reasonableness burden.
C. Reasonable in Relation to the Danger
Directors enjoy wide latitude in devising strategies to resist un-
friendly advances under the business judgment rule. 3 2 Courts
should, however, require directors to show that their action was
reasonable in relation to a danger posed,3 3 and thus no more ex-
tensive than necessary.
In Unocal, the Unocal board responded to Mesa's inadequate
and coercive offer by adopting a selective self-tender offer which
excluded Mesa from participating. 3 4 First, the Unocal board
wanted to defeat Mesa's inadequate first-tier offer. Second, should
Mesa's offer succeed, the board wanted to provide the forty-nine
percent back-end shareholders, who would otherwise be forced to
accept junk bonds, with $72 worth of senior debt. 3 5
Allowing Mesa to participate in the exchange offer would have
frustrated the Unocal board's efforts. The Delaware court ex-
plained that if Mesa could tender its shares, Unocal would effec-
tively subsidize Mesa's effort to buy Unocal shares at $54.136
effect during the sixty days preceding the date the rights were exercised or the highest sale
price per share during the sixty day period. Id. at 1255-56.
The deterrent effect was to create favorable option prices. This would result because
the price of a tender offer generally exceeds the target's stock price. Thus, the price of the
target's stock sixty days preceding the tender offer was generally substantially less. Minstar
claimed that the plan lacked a rational basis because it provided optionees significant cash
benefits without corresponding performance objectives, and constituted corporate waste.
Id. at 1256.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 1261. The court explained that if the changes were prudent steps to safeguard
the rights and benefits already earned and owed to AMF employees and to bring AMF in
line with the plans of similar companies, then conditioning the plan on a change in control
would have been unnecessary. Id.
132 Hanson II, 781 F.2d at 273 (citing Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255,
264 (2d Cir. 1984)).
133 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
134 Id at 950-51.
135 Id. at 956.
136 Id.
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Moreover, the court stated that Mesa could not, by definition, fit
within the class of shareholders requiring protection from its own
coercive and inadequate tender offer. 137 Because the selective na-
ture of the self-tender was necessary to remove a genuine danger
and to accomplish the goals of shareholder protection, the court
concluded that the defensive tactic was reasonable in relation to the
threat. 138
In Moran, the Household board implemented a poison pill
rights plan even though no tender offer had yet been made. 139 Fi-
nancial studies showed Household's current stock price was under-
valued in relation to the company's break-up value. The board was
concerned that Household was vulnerable to the dangers posed by
the increasing frequency of bust-up takeovers and front-end
loaded, two-tier tender offers in Household's industry.1 40
The rights plan entitled each Household shareholder to re-
ceive one right for each share of common stock owned.' 4 ' The
right, however, would issue and become immediately exercisable
only when one of two possible triggering events occurred: first, if
anyone acquired twenty percent of Household's outstanding com-
mon stock (twenty percent purchase trigger); or second, if anyone
publicly announced a tender offer for at least thirty percent of
Household's outstanding common stock (thirty percent offer trig-
ger).142 If the thirty percent offer trigger occurred, the rights were
still redeemable by the board for $.50 per right, but not if the
twenty percent purchase trigger occurred. 43
The plan's poison pill effect derived from a provision granting
stockholders different rights prior to and immediately after an ac-
quiring company performed a business combination with House-
hold. Once one of the two triggering events occurred, but before
the business combination, the rights entitled a holder to purchase
one-hundredth of a share of a new series of preferred stock for
$100, or $10,000 per share. 144 If, however, a stockholder did not
exercise the right to purchase the preferred stock and a merger or
other combination occurred, the rights would "flip-over" to the
surviving company's capital structure, entitling the stockholder to
purchase $200 of the common stock of the company for the $100
137 Id.
138 Id. On July 8, 1986, the SEC voted to prohibit selective self-tender offers. The SEC
added § (f)(8)(i) (the "all-holders requirement") to Rule 13(e)-4 of the Williams Act, supra
note 5. See SEC Release Nos. 33-6653, 34-23421, IC-15199 (July 8, 1986).
139 Moran, 500 A.2d at 1348-49.
140 Id. at 1349.
141 Id. at 1348.
142 Id. at 1348-49.




exercise price. 145 The plan thus forced a raider to "swallow the
pill," because once a business combination occurred and share-
holders exercised the rights, the plan immediately diluted the
raider's capital structure. In Moran, the increase in financing a take-
over of Household would have amounted to several billion
dollars.' 46
Moran argued that the plan was unreasonable in relation to the
threats posed to Household. Moran contended that the rights plan
caused Household shareholders to lose their right to receive and
accept any tender offers, and did not only prevent bust-up and co-
ercive takeovers. 147 After finding that pre-takeover tactics are per-
missible,' 48 the Delaware court rejected Moran's contention. The
court explained that the rights plan did not destroy assets or dilute
corporate funds, it did not affect the company's stock market price,
and it did not affect a shareholder's ability to conduct a proxy con-
test without triggering the rights. 14 9 More importantly, the court
noted that although the plan might deter some takeovers, it did not
absolutely prevent shareholders from receiving tender offers, be-
cause in the event of an actual offer, the redemption clause of the
rights plan would have enabled the Household board to use the
plan as an effective bargaining tool.' 50 For example, the House-
hold board could protect shareholders by conditioning the redemp-
tion of the rights on a bidder agreeing to pay all tendering
shareholders adequate and equal consideration.' 51 To that extent,
the Delaware Supreme Court in Moran found that the rights plan,
with its bargaining tool function, was a reasonable defensive mea-
sure adopted in relation to the threats posed even though no actual
bid had been made. 52
Although the Moran court found that the rights plan was rea-
sonable in relation to the threat of bust-up takeovers, 53 the court
recognized that a board does not have unbridled discretion to im-
plement a defensive tactic as a bargaining tool. 5 4 Thus, courts
must carefully examine the evidence to uncover situations where
the directors are acting under a pretext of attempting to use a de-
145 Id.
146 See Nat'l LJ., June 3, 1985, at 28, col. 2.
147 500 A.2d at 1353-54.
148 Id. at 1350.
149 Id. at 1354-55.
150 Id. at 1354.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 1357. The court also found that the directors made an informed decision to
implement the rights plan. Id. at 1356.
153 Id. at 1357.
154 Id. at 1354, 1357. See Dynamics Corp. v. CTS Corp., Nos. 86-1601, 86-1608 (7th Cir.
June 9, 1986) (poison pill plan unreasonable under the circumstances).
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fensive tactic as a bargaining tool for future takeover contests. In
those situations where another motive is apparent, courts should
not uphold directors' actions as reasonable in relation to a threat.
In addition to judging the board's action at the time of the
adoption of the rights plan, the Moran court recognized that the
board had to act reasonably if at a later date an actual offer was
made. Referring to the board's redemption power, the Delaware
court stated that while the Household directors were presently pro-
tected by the business judgment rule, the "ultimate response to an
actual takeover bid must be judged by the Directors' actions at that
time .... [and t]heir use of the Plan will be evaluated when and if
the issue arises." 1 55 Thus, if a board, upon reasonable investiga-
tion, found that an offer posed no danger to the company or its
shareholders, it would have a duty to redeem the rights.1 56
To meet their initial reasonableness burden, directors must
show that their defensive action was reasonable in relation to a gen-
uine danger posed by a bidder. The action must remove the dan-
ger but, because of the potential for shareholder gain from
legitimate offers, it cannot exceed that which is necessary to remove
the danger. Pre-takeover defensive action can also protect attrac-
tive companies and their shareholders by signaling to corporate
raiders that they will not succeed where their tactics pose a
threat.15 7 To meet the initial reasonableness burden, however, pre-
takeover defensive measures should contain a feature enabling the
board to use the measure as a bargaining tool when an actual take-
over situation arises. Such a feature gives the board sufficient flexi-
bility to deal, at a later time, with a bidder posing a legitimate
danger while not completely deterring beneficial offers.
IV. Conclusion
Traditionally, directors have enjoyed broad power to make de-
cisions concerning their company's "business and affairs."'I5 8 Re-
cent decisions, however, suggest that courts will not reflexively give
155 500 A.2d at 1357.
156 In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., Nos. 353 & 354 (Del. March
13, 1986), the Revlon board instituted several defensive tactics in response to a takeover
attempt by Pantry Pride, including a redeemable poison pill rights plan. The Revlon board
was faced with a situation where it chose to redeem the rights. The Delaware Supreme
Court noted that when the board adopted the rights plan, it was protecting shareholders
from an inadequate bid, while retaining, through the redemption provision, sufficient flexi-
bility to address any offer deemed within the shareholders' best interest. Revlon, slip op. at
14.
157 The court in Moran noted that pre-takeover defensive measures might reduce the
risk that the directors will fail to use their business judgment when under the pressure of an
intense bidding contest. 500 A.2d at 1350.
158 See note 6 supra.
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deference to the actions of directors in the face of a takeover threat.
This is necessary in light of the continuing increase in unsolicited
tender offers and the introduction of new and potent defense
tactics.
Courts should require directors to initially present evidence
showing that they had reasonable grounds for believing a danger to
the company and its stockholders existed and, to ensure balance,
that the action taken was reasonable in relation to the threat
posed. 59 The directors may then enjoy the presumption of the
business judgment rule. Such a review should assure that directors
act in the best interests of the company and its shareholders. The
proper balance will enable stockholders to enjoy their basic right to
transfer their ownership interests, while allowing directors to pro-
tect against genuine dangers to the company and its shareholders.
This will also allow a court to give some deference to a board's
decision without substituting its judgment for that of a board acting
reasonably.
James Farinaro
159 When a board cannot effectively remove a perceived danger, the board's duty of
protection changes. Accordingly, situations involving unavoidable dangers require a modi-
fication of the target board's initial reasonableness burden. An unavoidable danger may
occur when it becomes apparent that a bidder intends to succeed at any cost in acquiring a
company at an inadequate price and eventually break up the company. Because the board
cannot effectively remove the danger, the board's duty changes from protection to acting as
a corporate auctioneer to attract the best bid for the benefit of shareholders. Thus, instead
of demonstrating a perceived danger and showing a reasonable defensive measure adopted
to remove the danger, directors must show, to meet their initial reasonableness burden,
that their primary concern was for the interests of shareholders and that they took reason-
able action to allow and invite competing bids. The board can then enjoy the protections of
the business judgment rule. In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., Nos.
353 & 354 (Del. March 13, 1986), the court enjoined a lock-up option the Revlon board
granted to a white knight as a defensive measure. The court found that Pantry Pride, a
hostile bidder, posed an unavoidable danger which even the board recognized. The court
held that the directors did not meet their modified initial reasonableness burden because
the lock-up option ended an intense bidding contest in return for very little improvement in
the final bid to shareholders, and only protected the directors and certain Revlon notehold-
ers from personal liability. Revlon, slip op. at 17-25.
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